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The First Amendment's prohibition on prior restraints on
speech is generally understood to be near-absolute. The
doctrine permits prior restraints in only a handful of
circumstances, and tends to require compelling evidence of
their necessity. The focus of this Article is the source of an
unexpected but important challenge to this doctrine:
government surveillance in the digital age. Recent litigation
about the constitutionality of the Stored Communications Act
(SCA) highlights that challenge. The SCA authorizes the
government both to obtain a person's stored internet
communications from a service provider and to seek a gag
order preventing the provider from even notifying the person of
that fact. Though the government did not ultimately prevail in
the litigation, the case provides a renewed opportunity to
consider the tension between prior restraint doctrine and the
government's digital surveillance efforts.
This Article does that, offering three arguments. First, gag
orders issued under the SCA ought to be treated like classic
prior restraints that are valid in all but the rarest of cases.
Second, the SCA cannot pass constitutional muster even under
a more traditional strict scrutiny standard. Third, and
independently, the procedure that the statute creates for
obtaining a gag order is constitutionally deficient. In a
concluding section, the Article considers the government's
revised stance on SCA gag orders, and suggests an alternative
construction of the statute that may avoid constitutional
problems.
Associate at Ballard Spahr LLP. Graduate of Harvard Law School (J.D.,
2013), the University of Cambridge (M. Phil., 2010), and the University of
Alberta (B.A., 2008). The author is grateful to Alaizah Koorji, Jeremy A.
Kutner, Gayle Sproul, Matthew Schafer, Terry Skolnik, and Benjamin D.
White for comments.
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INTRODUCTION
The First Amendment abhors no restriction on speech more
than a prior restraint. A prior restraint on expression-a
restriction that "forbid[s] certain communications when issued
in advance of the time that such communications are to
occur"l-is "the most serious and the least tolerable
infringement on First Amendment rights,"2 and bears a "heavy
presumption" of unconstitutionality.3 In a word, the prohibition
on prior restraints under black-letter First Amendment law is
"near-absolute."
4
The focus of this Article is the source of an unexpected but
important challenge to classic prior restraint doctrine:
government surveillance in the digital age. Recent litigation
about the constitutionality of the Stored Communications Act
(SCA)5 highlights that challenge. The SCA authorizes the
government both to obtain a person's stored internet
communications from a service provider and to seek a gag
order preventing the provider from even notifying the person of
that fact. In April 2016, Microsoft brought a lawsuit against
the Department of Justice in federal court, alleging that gag
orders issued under the SCA constitute unconstitutional prior
restraints and content-based restrictions on speech.6 In a
February 2017 decision, the court denied the government's
motion to dismiss Microsoft's First Amendment claims.
7
Microsoft later agreed to drop the lawsuit after the Department
of Justice issued guidance to prosecutors heightening
requirements for obtaining gag orders.8
Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (quoting MELVILLE B.
NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 4.03 (1984)). The Court in
Alexander also noted that "[tiemporary restraining orders and permanent
injunctions-i.e., court orders that actually forbid speech activities-are
classic examples of prior restraints." Id. As Professors Lemley and Volokh
argue, however, "[a] permanent injunction, entered following a final
determination that the speech is unprotected, is generally seen as
constitutional." Mark A. Lemley & Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and
Injunctions in Intellectual Property Cases, 48 DUKE L.J. 147, 169-70 (1998).
2 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 559 (1976).
3 N.Y. Times Co. v. United States, 403 U.S. 713, 714 (1971) (per curiam).
4 2 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 15:2 (Supp.
2017).
5 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2012).
6 See generally First Amended Complaint, Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, No. 2:16-cv-00538-JLR (W.D. Wash. 2017) (No. 28), 2016 WL
3381727 [hereinafter, "Microsoft Complaint"].
7 Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 233 F. Supp. 3d 887, 894 (W.D. Wash.
2017).
8 Ellen Nakashima, Justice Department Moves to End Routine Gag Orders on
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Although it did not provide a final ruling on Microsoft's
First Amendment claims, the court was correct to reject the
Justice Department's motion to dismiss these claims. SCA gag
orders are prior restraints on speech, and they cannot
withstand the heavy scrutiny that should apply to them.
Recent decisions addressing the constitutionality of similar gag
orders in National Security Letters (NSLs), however, suggest
that courts may be sympathetic to the view that such orders
should not be tested against the scrutiny that applies to
traditional prior restraints. That premise is dubious. But even
granting it, the SCA poses serious constitutional problems. If
courts are to carve out an exception for prior restraints in the
era of digital surveillance, that exception should be exceedingly
narrow.
This Article proceeds in several parts. It opens with a
discussion of prior restraint doctrine and how courts have
applied it to gag orders in NSLs. It then turns to the SCA,
summarizing its relevant provisions and assessing whether the
gag orders it authorizes pass constitutional muster. The Article
concludes that they do not, but suggests an interpretation of
the statute that might remedy these issues.
I. PRIOR RESTRAINTS AND DIGITAL SURVEILLANCE
Prior restraints are, put simply, restrictions designed to
suppress speech before it takes place. They typically take the
form of an administrative scheme requiring a permit or license
to engage in certain speech, or a court order enjoining the
speech before it occurs.9
Classic First Amendment doctrine is uncompromising
towards these restrictions. It permits prior restraints in a
handful of circumstances, and requires the government to
present compelling evidence of their necessity. In the realm of
digital surveillance, however, that doctrine appears to be giving
way to a more permissive set of rules.
A. The Classic Doctrine
The First Amendment has long held prior restraints in
particular contempt. The Supreme Court's first notable
decision addressing prior restraints came in 1931, in Near v.
Minnesota.10 The Court held that a statute authorizing the
government to enjoin a newspaper from publishing "malicious,
moves-to-end-routine-gag-orders-on-tech-firms/2017/10/23/df8300bc-b848-
11e7-9e58-e6288544af98 story.html [http://perma.ce/PB53-TMY8].
9 SMOLLA, supra note 4, § 15:1.
10 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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scandalous or defamatory" content was unconstitutional.11
Drawing on the writings of William Blackstone and James
Madison, the Court recognized protection against prior
restraints to be a core purpose of the First Amendment; as it
explained, "liberty of the press, historically considered and
taken up the Federal Constitution, has meant, principally
although not exclusively, immunity from previous restraints or
censorship." 12 The Court acknowledged that this immunity "is
not absolutely unlimited," but confined it to "exceptional
cases." 13
Subsequent cases have retained this posture toward prior
restraints. In its 1971 decision in New York Times Co. v. United
States (the Pentagon Papers case), the Court held that the
First Amendment did not permit the government to enjoin the
New York Times and Washington Post from publishing the
contents of a classified government study about the history of
the Vietnam War.14 The Court's per curiam opinion repeated
that "any system of prior restraints of expression" bears "a
heavy presumption against its constitutional validity,"15 and
the separate opinions of justices in the majority either rejected
prior restraints per se or confined them to extenuating
circumstances.16  Five years later, in Nebraska Press
Association v. Stuart,17 the Court invalidated a gag order
limiting news coverage in a high-profile murder trial. The
Court explained that prior restraints were "in many ways more
inhibiting" than subsequent punishments:
[A system of prior restraint] is likely to bring
under government scrutiny a far wider range of
expression; it shuts off communication before it
takes place; suppression by a stroke of the pen is
more likely to be applied than suppression
11 Id. at 722-23.
12 Id. at 716.
13 Id.
14 403 U.S. 713, 719 (1971).
15 Id. at 714.
16 See SMOLLA, supra note 4, § 15:17 ("[The opinions of Justices Black and
Douglas] may fairly be read as holding that under the First Amendment no
prior restraints may ever be issued enjoining publications by the press."); see
also N.Y Times Co., 403 U.S. at 726-27 (Brennan, J., concurring) ("[O]nly
governmental allegation and proof that publication must inevitably, directly,
and immediately cause the occurrence of an event kindred to imperiling the
safety of a transport already at sea can support even the issuance of an
interim restraining order."); id. at 730 (Stewart, J., concurring) ("I cannot say
that disclosure .. . will surely result in direct, immediate, and irreparable
damage to our Nation or its people."); id. at 731 (White, J., concurring)
(declining to issue an injunction despite acknowledging that publication
would "do substantial damage to public interests").
17 427 U.S. 539 (1976).
2018
5
Sumar: Prior Restraints and Digital Surveillance: The Constitutionality
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository,
79 THE YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY
through a criminal process; the procedures do not
require attention to the safeguards of the
criminal process; the system allows less
opportunity for public appraisal and criticism;
the dynamics of the system drive toward
excesses, as the history of all censorship shows.
18
Thus, as the Court put it then and has reiterated since, "prior
restraints on speech and publication are the most serious and
the least tolerable infringement on First Amendment rights." 19
The Court has, understandably, been more permissive of
prior restraints where the state's target is speech unprotected
by the First Amendment. In the 1965 case Freedman v.
Maryland,20 the Court sanctioned the use of state-administered
licensing schemes for obscene films, provided they contain
three "procedural safeguards": (1) that "any restraint prior to
judicial review . . . be imposed for a specified brief period"; (2)
that "expeditious judicial review" be available for that decision;
and (3) that the government "bear the burden of going to court
to suppress the speech and ... bear the burden of proof once in
court."21 The Court has extended Freedman's applicability to
other kinds of licensing schemes, including some in which
protected speech is at issue.22 But even where a scheme targets
unprotected speech, the concern is that it will also suppress
protected speech in the interim period before review;23 the
safeguards seek to minimize that risk.
In short, where protected speech is involved, the law
appears to create an almost impossibly high standard-one
that goes further than the typical strict scrutiny standard-for
justifying prior restraints.
B. Prior Restraints in the Age of Digital Surveillance
18 Id. at 589-90.
19 Id. at 559; see also Tory v. Cochran, 544 U.S. 734, 738 (2005) (quoting
Nebraska Press, 427 U.S. at 559).
20 308 U.S. 51 (1965).
21 Thomas v. Chi. Park Dist., 534 U.S. 316, 321 (2002) (summarizing the
Freedman safeguards).
22 See Lemley & Volokh, supra note 1, at 180 ("[T]he Court has suggested that
the Freedman standards may apply in at least some non-obscenity contexts,
such as injunctions against offensive demonstrations." (citing Nat'l Socialist
Party of Am. v. Village of Skokie, 432 U.S. 43, 44 (1977))); see also In re Nat'l
Sec. Letter, 863 F.3d 1110, 1128 (9th Cir. 2017) ("In later years, the Supreme
Court has extended the applicability of Freedman, holding that government
schemes for licensing constitutionally permissible speech or communicative
conduct also require procedural safeguards.").
23 See Martin H. Redish, The Proper Role of the Prior Restraint Doctrine in First
Amendment Theory, 70 VA. L. REV. 53, 57 (1984).
Vol. 20
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In cases involving digital surveillance, however, courts
appear to have eschewed the strict constraints of classic prior
restraint doctrine. The best illustration of this trend can be
found in case law addressing the constitutionality of gag orders
in National Security Letters, where courts have relaxed the
applicable level of scrutiny to enable greater restraints on
speech.
NSLs are a unique form of administrative subpoena issued
principally by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) to
obtain personal information from communications providers
and others in connection with national security
investigations.24 The SCA authorizes the FBI to issue a gag
order with the subpoena, prohibiting the recipient from
disclosing the existence of the NSL.
25
The Second Circuit's 2008 decision in John Doe, Inc. v.
Mukasey26 is, to date, likely the most important statement on
the constitutionality of NSL gag orders. The Doe court found
that the statutory provisions governing these orders, which
have since been amended,27 violated the First Amendment.
28
The statute at issue permitted the FBI to issue a gag order
upon a senior official's certification that disclosure would cause
one of several enumerated harms: "danger to the national
security of the United States, interference with a criminal,
counterterrorism, or counterintelligence investigation,
interference with diplomatic relations, or danger to the life or
physical safety of any person."29 It also provided that the
recipient of an NSL could petition a district court for an order
modifying or setting aside the NSL.30 A court could only do so,
however, if it found "no reason to believe" that one of the
enumerated harms would transpire.31 If the Attorney General
or another senior official were to certify that disclosure would
endanger national security or interfere with diplomatic
24 See generally CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL33320, NATIONAL
SECURITY LETTERS IN FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INVESTIGATIONS: LEGAL
BACKGROUND (2015), http://fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL33320.pdf
[http://perma.ce/VM9M-GHES].
25 18 U.S.C. § 2709(c) (2012).
26 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008).
27 See USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 501, 129 Stat. 268,
282 (2015) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b)).
28 Doe, 549 F.3d at 876.
29 Id. at 866-67 ("Congress amended the nondisclosure prohibition of subsection
2709(c) to require nondisclosure only upon certification by senior FBI officials
that 'otherwise there may result a danger to the national security of the
United States, interference with a criminal, counterterrorism, or
counterintelligence investigation, interference with diplomatic relations, or
danger to the life or physical safety of any person."').
30 Id. at 867.
31 Id. at 868.
2018
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relations, that certification would be "conclusive" unless made
in "bad faith."
32
Although the Doe court ultimately concluded that the
statute did not comport with the First Amendment, it struggled
in its analysis of NSLs under prior restraint doctrine. The court
noted that an NSL gag order "is not a typical example" of a
prior restraint because it is not "imposed on those who
customarily wish to exercise rights of free expression, such as
speakers in public fora, distributors of literature, or exhibitors
of movies."33 Moreover, the "category of information" subject to
the gag order-i.e., "the fact of receipt of an NSL and some
related details"-is "far more limited than the broad categories
of information that have been at issue with respect to typical
content-based restrictions." 
34
For these reasons, the Second Circuit found that the gag
order provision was not "a typical prior restraint or a typical
content-based restriction warranting the most rigorous First
Amendment scrutiny."35 The panel could not agree whether to
apply "a standard of traditional strict scrutiny" or a standard of
"not quite as 'exacting' a form of strict scrutiny."36 Finding that
the issue would not affect the outcome of the case, and
accepting the government's concession that strict scrutiny
applied, the court applied the higher standard and interpreted
the statute fairly flexibly in order to avoid constitutional
problems.37
The Doe court identified issues of both substance and
procedure. On the former, the court narrowed the
circumstances in which the government could obtain a gag
order consistent with the First Amendment. The court found
the last of the statute's enumerated harms, endangerment of
"the life or physical safety of any person," to be "particularly
troublesome" because of the potential to "extend the
Government's power to impose secrecy to a broad range of
information." 38 The court avoided the constitutional issue "by
construing the scope of the enumerated harms in light of the
purposes for which an NSL is issued," the result being that all
enumerated harms under the statute must relate to "an
32 Id.
33 Id. at 876 (citing Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33 (1984))
(addressing the prohibition on disclosure of information obtained in court-
ordered discovery); id. at 876 n. 12 ("We note that none of the decisions
discussing the appropriateness or limits of grand jury secrecy has referred to
a nondisclosure requirement in that context as a prior restraint.").
34 Id. at 876.
35 Id. at 877.
36 Id. at 878.
37 Id.
38 Id. at 874.
Vol. 20
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authorized investigation to protect against international
terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities." 39 The Second
Circuit also read the statute to mean that the government had
the burden of persuading a district court of "a good reason to
believe" that one of the enumerated harms would transpire.
40
Finally, the court held that the provision making a senior
official's certification that disclosure would endanger national
security or disrupt diplomatic relations "conclusive" upon the
court was unconstitutional.
41
On procedure, the court looked to the three-part test under
Freedman. The court found that the statute as written did not
comply with Freedman's third prong-that the government
"bear the burden of going to court to suppress the speech" and
"the burden of proof in court"42-because it did not require the
government to initiate review. 43 Instead, the Second Circuit
devised its own procedure-one concededly not created by
statute, but that the government could follow of its own
accord-that satisfied Freedman.44 Under this "reciprocal
notice procedure," the government would be required to provide
an NSL recipient with notice of a gag order and their right to
challenge it in court.45 If the NSL recipient then notified the
government that it wished to contest the order, the government
would have to initiate a judicial review proceeding to justify the
order.
46
This reciprocal notice procedure, along with some generous
statutory interpretation, permitted the Doe court to salvage
most of the statute, giving the government a narrower but still
attainable means for obtaining gag orders. In 2015, Congress
amended the NSL gag order provisions, reflecting the changes
that Doe identified as necessary.
47
In 2017, the constitutionality of the amended provisions
came before the Ninth Circuit, in National Security Letter v.
Sessions ("Sessions").48 The district court had upheld the
provisions, relying on Doe's reasoning that an NSL gag order is
not a "typical example" of a prior restraint and holding that gag
orders both met the Freedman requirements and withstood
39 Id. at 875 n.6; id. at 876 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2709(b) (2012)).
40 Id. at 875 (emphasis added).
41 Id. at 884.
42 Id. at 871.
43 Id. at 880-81.
44 Id. at 879.
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 See USA FREEDOM Act of 2015, Pub. L. No. 114-23, § 502, 129 Stat. 268,
288-289 (2015).
48 In re Nat'l Sec. Letter, 863 F.3d 1110 (9th Cir. 2017).
2018
9
Sumar: Prior Restraints and Digital Surveillance: The Constitutionality
Published by Yale Law School Legal Scholarship Repository,
83 THE YALE JOURNAL OF LAW & TECHNOLOGY
strict scrutiny.49 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed.50 It
agreed with the district court that the Freedman safeguards
were satisfied and found that the provisions were content-
based restrictions that survived strict scrutiny.51 It relegated to
a footnote the appellants' argument that the NSL provisions, as
"a content-based restriction imposed by a system of prior
restraint," ought to be held to a standard "higher than strict
scrutiny."52 The court deemed that argument "meritless."53 For
one thing, according to the court, the per curiam opinion in the
Pentagon Papers case "did not specify a test that should be
applied to prior restraints."54 For another, the decision in
Nebraska Press merely "considered the availability of less
restrictive alternatives to a restraining order," which is entirely
"consistent with the application of strict scrutiny." 
55
Accordingly, the NSL provisions needed only to satisfy
strict scrutiny-in other words, to be "narrowly tailored to
serve compelling state interests"56-and, in the court's view,
they did so.
57
II. THE STORED COMMUNICATIONS ACT
Recent litigation about the constitutionality of the SCA
again pitted classic prior restraint doctrine against the
government's digital surveillance efforts. After summarizing
the relevant provisions of the SCA and the Microsoft decision,
this Article will turn to its own assessment of the statute's
constitutionality.
A. The Basics
Congress enacted the SCA as part of the Electronic
Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA).58 The SCA grew
out of concerns that the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution
49 In re Nat'l Sec. Letter v. Sessions, Nos. 11-CV-02173-SI, 3:11-CV-2667 SI,
3:13-MC-80089 SI, 3:13-CV-1165 SI, slip op. at 20 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 29, 2016)
(citing Doe, 549 F.3d at 876), http://www.eff.org/document/redacted-order
[http://perma.ce/VQS3-BZJS].
50 Sessions, 863 F.3d at 1114.
51 Id. at 1131.




56 Id. at 1121.
57 Id. at 1126.
58 18 U.S.C. §§ 2510 et seq. (2012).
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provided little if any protection for internet communications.59
Based on the law at the time of the SCA's conception,60 internet
users had no clear expectation of privacy in information, such
as web history and e-mail, that was necessarily shared with
network providers. The Constitution did not prohibit private
parties like internet service providers from disclosing a
person's internet communications to the government.1 The
result, as policymakers saw it, was inadequate legal protection
for a person's stored internet communications.
The SCA filled this gap by creating "a range of statutory
privacy rights against access to stored account information
held by network service providers."6 2 The SCA facilitates this
in two ways: It limits the government's ability to compel
network service providers to provide information about their
customers and subscribers, and it limits the ability of service
providers to voluntarily disclose that same information to the
government.63
The SCA applies to two kinds of service providers. First, it
covers providers of an "electronic communications service"
(ECS), which is "any service which provides to users thereof the
ability to send or receive wire or electronic communications."
6 4
Second, the statute covers providers of a "remote computer
service" (RCS), defined as "the provision of computer storage or
processing services by means of an electronic communications
system."6 5 The distinction between an ECS and RCS can be
somewhat esoteric.66 What matters for our purposes is that the
SCA covers various kinds of internet communications stored
with service providers.
59 Orin S. Kerr, A User's Guide to the Stored Communications Act, and a
Legislator's Guide to Amending It, 72 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1208, 1209-13
(2004).
60 More recent jurisprudence has called into question the principle that
individuals do not have a reasonable expectation of privacy in internet
communications, such as e-mail messages. See, e.g., In re Grand Jury
Subpoena, JK-15-029, 828 F.3d 1083, 1090 (9th Cir. 2016) ("[Elmail should be
treated like physical mail for purposes of determining whether an individual
has a reasonable expectation of privacy in its content.").
61 Kerr, supra note 59, at 1209-10.
62 Id. at 1212.
63 Id. at 1212-13. The statute also criminalizes unauthorized access to stored
communications. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 (2012).
64 18 U.S.C. § 2510(15) (2012).
65 Id. § 2711(2).
66 See Kerr, supra note 59, at 1215-18; id. at 1215-16 ("The classifications of
ECS and RCS are context sensitive: the key is the provider's role with respect
to a particular copy of a particular communication, rather than the provider's
status in the abstract. A provider can act as an RCS with respect to some
communications, an ECS with respect to other communications, and neither
an RCS nor an ECS with respect to other communications.").
2018
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The SCA also draws a distinction between the "contents" of
communications (e.g., the text of an e-mail message), on the
one hand, and "non-content" information (e.g., the source and
destination e-mail address) on the other.
6 7
18 U.S.C. § 2703 sets out the requirements that apply when
the government seeks to compel a service provider to disclose a
customer or subscriber's information. These requirements vary
based on the service provider and nature of the communication
sought. Put simply, though, these rules operate as "an upside-
down pyramid": the more process the government observes, the
more information it has access to.68 At the very bottom, the
government can obtain basic subscriber information with a
simple subpoena, which requires no notice to the subscriber.9
The more process the government satisfies-i.e., providing
notice to the subscriber or obtaining a court order or warrant
rather than a subpoena-the greater its access to
information.70 At the very top of the inverted pyramid, only by
means of a search warrant, the government can compel a
service provider to disclose all of the information in its
possession.71
B. The Gag-Order Provision
The SCA's gag-order provision is found at 18 U.S.C. §
2705(b):
(b) Preclusion of Notice to Subject of
Governmental Access.-A governmental entity
acting under section 2703, when it is not
required to notify the subscriber or customer
under section 2703(b)(1), or to the extent that it
may delay such notice pursuant to subsection (a)
of this section, may apply to a court for an order
commanding a provider of electronic
communications service or remote computing
service to whom a warrant, subpoena, or court
order is directed, for such period as the court
deems appropriate, not to notify any other person
of the existence of the warrant, subpoena, or
court order. The court shall enter such an order if
it determines that there is reason to believe that
67 In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b),
131 F. Supp. 3d 1266, 1267-69 (D. Utah 2015).
68 Kerr, supra note 59, at 1222.
69 18 U.S.C. § 2703(c)(2) (2012); see Kerr, supra note 59, at 1222.
70 18 U.S.C. §§ 2703(a)-(c) (2012).
71 Id. § 2703(a).
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notification of the existence of the warrant,
subpoena, or court order will result in-
(1) endangering the life or physical safety of
an individual;
(2) flight from prosecution;
(3) destruction of or tampering with evidence;
(4) intimidation of potential witnesses; or
(5) otherwise seriously jeopardizing an
investigation or unduly delaying a trial.
72
The statute has a clearly broad sweep. A gag order lasts "for
such period as the court deems appropriate."73 If the court has
reason to believe" that any one of the enumerated
consequences in the statute would follow from disclosure, it
"shall enter" the order.74 In short, a court may issue a gag order
"for all requests of information under § 2703," regardless of the
nature of the information sought and from whom it is sought.
75
C. Microsoft v. DOJ
In April 2016, Microsoft filed suit in district court in the
state of Washington, seeking a declaration that §§ 2703 and
2705(b) violate the First and Fourth Amendments of the
Constitution.76  Microsoft, a provider of cloud computing
services, contended that the government has increasingly
sought to obtain private information not from cloud customers
themselves, but from service providers like Microsoft.77 Over a
twenty-month period ending in May 2016, Microsoft itself was
72 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b) (2012).
73 Id.
74 Id. (emphasis added).
75 See In re Application of the U.S. for an Order Pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
2705(b), 131 F. Supp. 3d 1266, 1275 (D. Utah 2015).
A source of some confusion has been the language at the beginning of
§ 2705(b): "A government entity acting under section 2703, when it is not
required to notify the subscriber or customer under section 2703(b)(1) .... 18
U.S.C. § 2705(b) (2012) (emphasis added). This language suggests, sensibly,
that the government cannot obtain a gag order in cases where the SCA
requires the government to give notice to the subscriber or customer of a
subpoena or court order. See id. § 2703(b)(1)(B); In re Application of the U.S.,
131 F. Supp. 3d at 1274-75. But the analysis does not end there. Even where
notice to a customer or subscriber is required under § 2703(b)(1), the
government can delay notice under § 2705(a). Section 2705(b), in turn,
permits the government to seek a gag order "to the extent that it may delay
[notice to the customer or subscriber] pursuant to subsection (a) of this
section." The upshot is that if the government can satisfy the requirements
for delayed notice under § 2705(a) (which appear identical to those for a gag
order), it may also obtain a gag order.
76 Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 233 F. Supp. 3d 887 (W.D. Wash.
2017).
77 Microsoft Complaint, supra note 6, at 4.
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subjected to 3,250 gag orders, two-thirds of which have no fixed
end date.78 Microsoft acknowledged that gag orders might be
permissible in exceptional circumstances, but argued that the
SCA's sweep, as effectuated by the government, had been
obviously overbroad.
79
The district court sided with Microsoft in part. Judge
Robart dismissed Microsoft's Fourth Amendment claim, on the
ground that Microsoft lacked the standing to assert the privacy
rights of its customers,80 but held that Microsoft had stated a
claim under the First Amendment.81 Judge Robart rejected the
government's arguments that Microsoft was without standing
to challenge § 2705(b); he found that gag orders "that
indefinitely prevent Microsoft from speaking about government
investigations implicate Microsoft's First Amendment rights,"
causing an injury that is sufficiently particularized, likely to
reoccur, and redressable via declaratory relief.
8 2
Turning to the merits, Judge Robart concluded that
Microsoft "adequately alleged a facially plausible First
Amendment claim"8 3  that § 2705(b) gag orders are
impermissible prior restraints and content-based restrictions.
8 4
The government argued that even if the gag orders are prior
restraints, § 2705(b) contained the requisite procedural
protections set out in Freedman.8 5 Judge Robart explained,
however, that Freedman does not apply in this context because
§ 2705(b) gag orders are less like "administrative prior
restraints imposed by a licensing scheme" and more akin to
"permanent injunctions preventing speech from taking place
before it occurs."86
In an important footnote, Judge Robart rejected two
arguments that the government offered for applying a lower
standard of scrutiny to § 2705(b). First, he was not persuaded
by the government's argument that the affected speech "does
not address matters of public concern."87 Matters of public
concern, he noted, are "matters related to political, social, or
other concerns to the community."88 Second, he declined to find,
78 Id. 5.
79 Id. 6.
80 Microsoft Corp., 233 F. Supp. 3d at 912-16.
81 Id. at 904-12.
82 Id. at 900-04. Judge Robart also rejected the government's argument that the
court should reject the suit on "comity grounds." Id. at 904.
83 Id. at 908.
84 Id. at 904-08.
85 Id. at 906.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 906 n.7.
88 Id. (citing Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 452 (2011)). He also relied on the
Supreme Court's tatement in First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435
U.S. 765, 777 (1978), that "[t]he inherent worth of the speech in terms of its
Vol. 20
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as the Second Circuit did in Doe, that a § 2705(b) gag order "is
not a typical prior restraint or a typical content-based
restriction warranting the most rigorous First Amendment
scrutiny."89 Judge Robart distinguished § 2705(b) gag orders on
two grounds: (1) these orders, unlike NSL gag orders, can be
deployed outside the national security context, and (2)
§ 2705(b), unlike the NSL statute, permits gag orders of
potentially unlimited duration.90
Taking Microsoft's allegations as true, Judge Robart found
that § 2705(b) orders could operate as prior restraints and
content-based restrictions. He held that Microsoft's stated
facts-that the gag orders can be of prolonged duration, that
the "reason to believe" standard is too permissive, and that the
statute is otherwise deficient91 -were sufficient to state a First
Amendment claim. 92 And even if a standard lower than strict
scrutiny were to apply, Microsoft's allegations gave rise to a
reasonable inference that "indefinite nondisclosure orders
impermissibly burden Microsoft's First Amendment rights."
93
Judge Robart accordingly denied the government's motion to
dismiss Microsoft's complaint.
94
In October 2017, Microsoft announced that it planned to
drop its lawsuit after the Department of Justice issued binding
guidance limiting the availability of § 2705(b) gag orders.95 The
guidance memo states that every gag order "should have an
appropriate factual basis" and "should extend only as long as
necessary to satisfy the government's interest."96  More
capacity for informing the public does not depend upon the identity of its
source, whether corporation, association, union, or individual." Id.
89 Id. at 907 n.7 (quoting John Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861, 877 (2d Cir.
2008)).
90 Id.
91 Id. at 907-08.
92 Id. at 907-08. Specifically, the court accepted Microsoft's allegation that
§ 2705(b) "allows an indefinite disclosure 'in the absence of any case-specific
compelling interest,' is 'substantially broader than necessary,' and 'provides
no meaningful constraints."' Id.
93 Id. at 908. Here, Judge Robart cited Microsoft's allegations that "indefinite
nondisclosure orders continue to burden its First Amendment rights after the
government's interest in keeping investigations secret dissipates," and that
"courts do not have occasion to revisit the indefinite orders unless Microsoft
challenges the individual orders in court." Id.
94 Id. Judge Robart also found that Microsoft had sufficiently stated claims that
§ 2705(b) is impermissibly overbroad and violated the First Amendment as-
applied to Microsoft. Id. at 908-12.
95 See Memorandum from Rod J. Rosenstein, Deputy Att'y Gen., to Heads of
Dep't Law Enft Components, Dep't Litigating Components, Dir. of Exec.
Office for U.S. Att'ys, & All U.S. Att'ys (Oct. 19, 2017),
http: /apps.washingtonpost.com/g/documents /world/read-doj s-new-policy-on-
gag-orders/2610/ [http://perma.cc/7NFE-YLRY] [hereinafter Rosenstein
Memorandum].
96 Id. at 1.
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concretely, the memo requires prosecutors to conduct "an
individualized and meaningful assessment" about whether an
order is necessary; obligates them to "tailor the application to
include the available facts of the specific case and/or concerns":
limits delay of notice to one year or less, "barring exceptional
circumstances"; and permits extensions for a period only of
equal or shorter duration.
97
III. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF § 2705(B)
The Microsoft case again highlights the tension between
classic prior restraint jurisprudence and government
surveillance in the digital age. SCA gag orders are a form of
what Professor Jack Balkin has dubbed "new school" speech
regulation.98 Government surveillance requires "access to the
facilities through which most people are speaking," which, in
turn, requires "access to the infrastructure of free expression,
which is largely held in private hands."99 The result is that
governments must "coerce or co-opt the private owners of the
infrastructure of free expression" in their surveillance
efforts.100 Put another way, government surveillance inevitably
leads "to prior restraints on owners of private infrastructure or
techniques that operate in much the same way as prior
restraints."101 This phenomenon itself is not new, but its extent
in the digital age is.
The Article offers three arguments here. First, SCA gag
orders ought to be treated like classic prior restraints that are
valid in all but the rarest of cases. Second-and here the
Article builds on the analysis in Microsoft-the SCA cannot
pass constitutional muster even under a more traditional strict
scrutiny standard. Third, and independently, the procedure
that the statute creates for obtaining a gag order is
constitutionally deficient. A final section considers the Justice
Department's revised stance on gag orders and an alternative
construction of the SCA that may avoid constitutional
problems.
A. SCA Gag Orders Are Prior Restraints-Period
There can be no real dispute that a § 2705(b) gag order
meets the classic definition of a prior restraint, for it "forbid[s]
certain communications when issued in advance of the time
91 Id. at 2-3.
98 See Jack M. Balkin, Old-School/New-School Speech Regulation, 127 HARv. L.
REV. 2296, 2324-25 (2014).
99 Id. at 2329.
100 Id.
101 Id. at 2330.
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that such communications are to occur."10 2 Once a court issues
a § 2705(b) order, the service provider to whom the request has
been issued (in the form of a warrant, court order, or subpoena)
cannot speak to anyone about that request. A § 2705(b) gag
order is thus clearly a prior restraint. The Supreme Court's
jurisprudence, as discussed, makes it exceptionally difficult for
the government to justify these restrictions on speech-the
result being that SCA gag orders are invalid in all but the
rarest of cases.
The NSL cases do not provide particularly compelling
reasons for departing from this jurisprudence. Doe rested its
holding on the fact that NSL gag orders are not "typical
example[s]" of a prior restraint, because they are not "imposed
on those who customarily wish to exercise rights of free
expression, such as speakers in public fora, distributors of
literature, or exhibitors of movies." 10 3 The court also cited the
Supreme Court's decision in Seattle Times v. Rhinehart, which
found protective orders in the context of pretrial civil discovery
to be consistent with the First Amendment. 10 4 But this analysis
is not fully persuasive. For one thing, the strength of First
Amendment protections typically does not vary based on the
identity of the speaker. If anything, the content of the speech at
issue in Doe and similar cases-about whom the government
surveils and what information it seeks-would be entitled to
particularly vigorous protection as bearing on matters of
indisputable public concern.10 5 For another, the analogy to
protective orders in pretrial discovery is inapt. In such cases,
parties generally "opt in" to the protective order; they gain
information "only by virtue of the trial court's discovery
processes," which "are a matter of legislative grace."106 A
recipient of a § 2705(b) or NSL gag order, in contrast, is an
unwilling participant in the censorship the government
imposes upon it.
At the same time, the reasons Judge Robart gave in
Microsoft to differentiate Doe were also unpersuasive. He
distinguished Doe on the basis of its "national security context"
102 Alexander v. United States, 509 U.S. 544, 550 (1993) (quoting MELVILLE B.
NIMMER, NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 4.03 (1984)).
103 John Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861, 876 (2d Cir. 2008).
104 467 U.S. 20, 33-34 (1984) ("[lit is significant to note that an order prohibiting
dissemination of discovered information before trial is not the kind of classic
prior restraint that requires exacting First Amendment scrutiny."), cited in
Doe, 549 F.3d at 876.
105 See, e.g., Snyder v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 451-52 (2011) (noting that speech on
matters of public concern is "at the heart of the First Amendment's
protection"); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 145 (1983) ("[Slpeech on public
issues occupies the highest rung of the hierarchy of First Amendment values,
and is entitled to special protection." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
106 Seattle Times, 467 U.S. at 32.
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and the fact that the NSL statute, unlike § 2705(b), "imposed
temporal limits on the nondisclosure orders."10 7 But the mere
fact that national security concerns are at play does not
warrant a lower standard of scrutiny; indeed, the Pentagon
Papers case suggests that the opposite is true. And the point
that § 2705(b) orders are potentially indefinite in duration is
probably best considered in determining whether the law
satisfies the applicable standard of scrutiny, not what standard
applies in the first place.
The Ninth Circuit's reasoning in Sessions fares little better.
The court, again, found that prior restraints do not merit more
than strict scrutiny because (i) the per curiam opinion in the
Pentagon Papers case did not announce a separate test for
prior restraints, and (ii) the test Nebraska Press announced for
gag orders in criminal trials is "consistent" with the application
of strict scrutiny.108 These statements are true, but incomplete.
The absence of a legal standard in the Pentagon Papers' per
curiam decision does not end the analysis: the court ought to
have looked to the individual opinions of the majority
justices,0 9 each of which set out a different legal standard.
Justice Stewart's formulation-requiring evidence of "direct,
immediate, and irreparable damage" before a prior restraint
will be granted-has been regularly applied by the lower
courts.110 The Supreme Court, moreover, has frequently noted
that the burden for justifying a prior restraint is heavier than
that for a subsequent punishment.1 1 The best reading of these
cases is that prior restraints must endure something more than
traditional strict scrutiny.
107 Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 233 F. Supp. 3d 887, 906 n.7 (W.D.
Wash. 2017).
108 Nat'l Sec. Letter v. Sessions, 863 F.3d 1110, 1127 n.21 (9th Cir. 2017).
109 See Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 325 (2003) ("[W]hen a fragmented
Court decides a case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the
assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may be viewed as that
position taken by those Members who concurred in the judgments on the
narrowest grounds." (citation omitted)). A group of amici curiae make this
observation in the brief seeking rehearing of the Ninth Circuit's decision. See
Brief for The Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press et al. as Amici
Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 14 n.5, Nat'l Security Letter v. Sessions, No.
16-16067 (9th Cir. 2017).
110 See, e.g., Procter & Gamble Co. v. Bankers Tr. Co., 78 F.3d 219, 226 (6th Cir.
1996) (Martin, Jr., J., concurring); Matter of Providence Journal Co., 820 F.2d
1342, 1350-1351 (1st Cir. 1986), modified on reh'g, 820 F.2d 1354 (1st Cir.
1987); Bernard v. Gulf Oil Co., 619 F.2d 459, 473 (5th Cir. 1980) (en banc),
affd, 452 U.S. 89 (1981); United States v. Progressive, Inc., 467 F. Supp. 990,
1000 (W.D. Wis. 1979); see also Def. Distributed v. U.S. Dep't of State, 865
F.3d 211, 213 (5th Cir. 2017) (citing Bernard, 619 F.2d at 473).
111 See, e.g., Se. Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 558-59 (1975) ("The
presumption against prior restraints is heavier-and the degree of protection
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The Ninth Circuit's reliance on Nebraska Press is somewhat
more convincing, but not entirely so. There, the Supreme Court
held that the constitutionality of a gag order imposed to protect
a criminal defendant's right to a fair trial turned on three
factors: the nature and extent of pretrial news coverage, the
availability of alternative measures, and the likely
effectiveness of a restraining order.112 This standard is,
admittedly, reminiscent of strict scrutiny.1 3 But it does not
follow that Nebraska Press necessarily has general
applicability to other types of prior restraints; the
countervailing constitutional interest in these cases, a
defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial, affected
where the Court drew this particular line. What's more, in
practice the Nebraska Press standard is rarely satisfied, and
lower courts tend to treat it "as tantamount to an absolute
prohibition" on prior restraints in criminal trials.
1 1 4
Whatever the precise legal reasoning of Doe, Sessions, and
other cases, the concern driving them is a pragmatic one:
permitting a service provider to notify a customer or subscriber
of a search will, in some cases, undermine an investigation.
Indeed, the law already reflects the government's interest in
conducting covert searches during the course of a criminal
investigation. For example, the government has established
but limited authority to conduct covert searches of physical
places. Such searches, pursuant to so-called "sneak and peek"
warrants, have become more prevalent after the passage of the
PATRIOT Act.1 15 But even before then, courts had permitted
law enforcement authorities to conduct searches of physical
places without prior notice to the search target, so long as
certain strict conditions-for example, the government's
provision of a good reason for delayed notice-were met.1 16
112 Nebraska Press Ass'n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 562 (1976).
113 See Balkin, supra note 98, at 2335 (referring to the "potentially less stringent
standard" for prior restraints in Nebraska Press).
114 See SMOLLA, supra note 4, § 15:30 (noting that, while Nebraska Press "did not
go so far as to hold prior restraints of coverage of criminal trials absolutely
impermissible in all circumstances," it is "a precedent that has come to be
understood as something even more forceful than the test announced" in the
case); see also Erwin Chemerinsky, Lawyers Have Free Speech Rights, Too:
Why Gag Orders on Trial Participants Are Almost Always Unconstitutional,
17 Loy. L.A. ENT. L.J. 311, 311-12 (1997) ("The Supreme Court's decision in
Nebraska Press Assn v. Stuart has virtually precluded gag orders on the
press as a way of preventing prejudicial pretrial publicity.").
115 See Jonathan Witmer-Rich, The Fatal Flaws of the "Sneak and Peek" Statute
and How To Fix It, 65 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 121, 121 (2014).
116 See United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1337 (2d Cir. 1990) (addressing
searches for intangible evidence); United States v. Freitas, 800 F.2d 1451,
1456 (9th Cir. 1986) (authorizing covert entries where notice is given within
seven days, "except upon a strong showing of necessity").
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Wiretaps are an even better example. As courts have noted,
wiretaps "would likely produce little evidence of wrongdoing if
the wrongdoers knew in advance that their conversations or
actions would be monitored."117 The law accordingly prohibits a
service provider from disclosing the existence of a wiretap.
118
The same is true for pen registers1 9 and Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act subpoenas.1 20 The constitutionality of these
provisions does not appear to have been tested, and it does not
follow from their existence that the SCA comports with the
First Amendment. But these provisions do lend some weight to
the government's general policy justification for applying a
lower level of scrutiny to gag orders.
At the same time, the policy concerns disfavoring gag
orders are not insignificant. The numbers suggest that at least
in the past, the government deployed § 2705(b) orders-as it
did with NSL gag orders-overzealously. Recall that Microsoft
itself received 3,250 § 2705(b) orders in 20 months; over 2,000
of these were for indefinite durations.121  Driving the
government's increasing reliance on these orders is a massive
117 Villegas, 899 F.2d at 1336; see also Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 355
n.16 (1967) ("[T]he fact that the petitioner in Osborn was unaware that his
words were being electronically transcribed did not prevent this Court from
sustaining his conviction, and did not prevent the Court in Berger from
reaching the conclusion that the use of the recording device sanctioned in
Osborn was entirely lawful.").
118 18 U.S.C. § 2511(2)(a)(ii) (2012) ("No provider of wire or electronic
communication service, officer, employee, or agent thereof, or landlord,
custodian, or other specified person shall disclose the existence of any
interception or surveillance or the device used to accomplish the interception
or surveillance with respect to which the person has been furnished a court
order or certification under this chapter."); see also Doe v. Gonzales, 500 F.
Supp. 2d 379, 392 (S.D.N.Y. 2007), affd in part, rev'd in part and remanded
sub nom. John Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861 (2d Cir. 2008), as modified
(Mar. 26, 2009).
119 18 U.S.C. § 3123(d)(2) (2012) ("An order authorizing or approving the
installation and use of a pen register or a trap and trace device shall direct
that . . . the person owning or leasing the line or other facility to which the
pen register or a trap and trace device is attached or applied, or who is
obligated by the order to provide assistance to the applicant, not disclose the
existence of the pen register or trap and trace device or the existence of the
investigation to the listed subscriber, or to any other person, unless or until
otherwise ordered by the court.").
120 50 U.S.C. § 1861(d) (2012) ("No person shall disclose to any other person that
the Federal Bureau of Investigation has sought or obtained tangible things
pursuant to an order issued or an emergency production required under this
section..."); see also id. § (d)(2).
121 For its part, Twitter received a similar number of orders in the 18 months
spanning 2015 and 2016: 3,315 orders, nearly half of which were indefinite.
Brief of Amicus Curiae Twitter, Inc. in Support of Microsoft Corporation's
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of
Justice, No. 2:16-cv-00538-JLR, at *14 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 2, 2016)
[hereinafter Twitter Amicus Brief].
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expansion in the use of cloud computing services-by
individuals and businesses alike-provided by companies like
Microsoft and Apple. 122 And as Microsoft illustrates, there may
be no recourse for unconstitutional surveillance unless
companies can speak about it: Companies likely lack standing
to challenge the search itself, 123 and the gag order prevents the
only persons who could have standing-the targets of the
search-from ever knowing about it. 124  Moreover,
governmental overreach on surveillance is well documented. In
2013, for example, it came to light that the Justice Department
had obtained two months of phone telephone records for
reporters and editors of the Associated Press in the course of a
leak investigation, in violation of the Department's own
rules.125 Those records were sought pursuant to a subpoena; as
others have observed, the request may never have come to light
had it been made via an NSL. 126 Endowing the government
with broad authority to gag service providers unquestionably
creates a potential for abuse.
In short, it is hard to dispute that applying strict scrutiny
to SCA gag orders represents a departure from prior restraint
doctrine. But other courts confronted with similar issues may
be swayed by policy concerns and be inclined to follow the
reasoning in Doe or Sessions. It is therefore worth asking: Do
122 See Tony Danova, The Cloud Computing Report: How Different Cloud
Services Are Competing for Users and Pushing Up Usage, Bus. INSIDER (July
25, 2014), http://www.businessinsider.com/cloud-report-competing-for-users-
and-pushing-up-usage-2014-7 [http://perma.cc/3ZGX-CZ9B] (noting that "90%
of global internet users are already on the cloud" and that "traffic to the cloud
from mobile devices will grow at a compound annual rate of 63% between
2013 and 2018").
123 See Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 233 F. Supp. 3d 887, 914 (W.D.
Wash. 2017).("[T]he Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit have also adhered to
the principle that a third party may not sue to vindicate another person's
Fourth Amendment rights in cases that did not involve the exclusionary rule
or Section 1983." (citing Cal. Bankers Ass'n v. Schultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974);
Ellwest Stereo Theatres, Inc. v. Wenner, 681 F.2d 1243 (9th Cir. 1982)).
124 In theory, if a criminal prosecution followed, the defendant could challenge
the search on Fourth Amendment grounds in a motion to suppress. But that
can only happen if the government ultimately told the defendant how it
obtained the evidence-and the government has a track record of not doing so
in cases of digital surveillance. See, e.g., Patrick Toomey, Why Aren't
Criminal Defendants Getting Notice of Section 702 Surveillance Again?,
JUST SEC. (December 11, 2015), http://www.justsecurity.org/28256/arent-
criminal-defendants-notice-section- 702-surveillance-again
[http://perma.cc/43KY-2BUC].
125 Mark Sherman, Gov't Obtains Wide AP Phone Records in Probe, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, May 14, 2013, http://www.ap.org/ap-in-the-news/2013/govt-obtains-
wide-ap-phone-records-in-probe [http://perma.cc/E2G4-JCNZ].
126 Balkin, supra note 98, at 2339.
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§ 2705(b) gag orders, as content-based restrictions on speech,127
satisfy strict scrutiny?
B. SCA Gag Orders Fall Short of Strict Scrutiny, Too
A restriction on speech satisfies strict scrutiny only if it is
"narrowly tailored to promote a compelling Government
interest," and there are no "less restrictive alternatives that
would be at least as effective in achieving the legitimate
purpose that the statute was enacted to serve." 128 Based on the
allegations in Microsoft, SCA gag orders cannot meet this
standard.
Microsoft's suit raised three issues with the substance of
§ 2705(b): (1) that gag orders can be of prolonged, and
potentially unlimited, duration; (2) that a court need only have
a "reason to believe" that one of the enumerated adverse
consequences would follow from disclosure; and (3) that the last
of these enumerated consequences-that disclosure would
"otherwise seriously jeopardiz[e] an investigation or unduly
delayH a trial"-is an overbroad catch-all.129 Each of these, as
Judge Robart recognized, raises a serious First Amendment
problem. That is to say, to the extent that each of the statute's
enumerated consequences is considered a compelling interest,
the law is not narrowly tailored in advancing those interests.
The statute's authorization of potentially indefinite gag
orders is perhaps the least defensible of these consequences.
The statute vests courts with the discretion to determine the
duration of a gag order, which shall last "for such period as the
court deems appropriate." 130  However, the experience of
companies like Microsoft and Twitter suggests that, prior to
the Justice Department's new guidance, judges routinely
deferred to the government's judgment that an indefinite order
was warranted.131 As the government has now recognized, less
restrictive alternatives to indefinite gag orders are available.
The statute could, for example, require that the government
periodically appear before a judge to justify maintaining the
order. The statute could also provide that an order expires after
127 This Article takes for granted that SCA gag orders are, in fact, restrictions on
speech based on content.
128 John Doe, Inc. v. Mukasey, 549 F.3d 861, 876 (2d Cir. 2008) (quoting United
States v. Playboy Entm'nt Grp., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000); Reno v. Am. Civil
Liberties Union, 521 U.S. 844, 874 (1997)).
129 Microsoft Complaint, supra note 6, 23-33 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b)
(2012)).
130 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b) (2012)..
131 As noted, a substantial proportion of the information requests to these
companies contained gag orders: two thirds for Microsoft and just over half
for Twitter. See supra text accompanying note 121.
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a criminal investigation is complete, or even after the target of
an investigation has been prosecuted or sentenced. At least as
it had been previously applied, § 2705(b) goes further than it
needs to and accordingly fails the narrow tailoring
requirement.
The same is true for the two other issues Microsoft
identified. The "reason to believe" standard sets an
unacceptably low threshold for granting a gag order. The
standard means, ostensibly, that the government could
restrain a service provider's speech on the basis of speculation
or pro forma rationales and has no obligation to produce actual,
concrete evidence of potential harm. Heightening the standard
for granting an order would be, to be sure, more burdensome on
the government. And as the Department of Justice points out,
the government will be less equipped to make a full factual
showing at the outset of an investigation.132 But setting the
"reason to believe" standard as the minimum showing for all
cases sets the bar too low.
As for the catch-all, it is admittedly hard to say that the
words "seriously jeopardiz[e] an investigation" and "unduly
delayH a trial"133 are overbroad, without knowing how courts
actually apply the provision. That makes this argument
necessarily more tentative than the others. But Microsoft is at
least right that the language is somewhat vague. And the fact
that other companies affected by § 2705(b) orders have singled
it out for criticism1 34 suggests that, at least in the past, the
government has tended to rely on it fairly frequently. It might
be the case that, in practice, courts have interpreted the
language loosely and deferred to the government even when
the risk of compromising an investigation or a trial's timeliness
is small. If so, these are still state interests-but probably not
compelling ones.
132 Rosenstein Memorandum, supra note 95, at 2 ("The factors justifying
protection from disclosure may be similar in many cases, particularly at the
outset of an investigation. As appropriate, prosecutors may state the extent
to which the stage of the investigation limits the availability of specific facts
justifying the § 2705(b) order.").
133 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b) (2012).
134 Twitter Amicus Brief, supra note 121, at 12. Twitter notes, for example, that
the Department of Justice's Guide to the SCA itself suggests that agents
seeking a gag order under § 2705(b) include boilerplate language that
"notification of the existence of [an order] would seriously jeopardize the
ongoing investigation." Id. at 13. (quoting U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SEARCHING
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C. Problems of Procedure
In addition to the above, the SCA suffers from at least one
more flaw: The procedure it establishes for the government to
obtain a gag order does not comport with the First
Amendment.
The Doe and Sessions decisions applied the three-part test
from Freedman, and Doe ultimately devised its own
constitutionally compliant procedure for gag orders. But in this
respect these decisions cannot be straightforwardly applied to
§ 2705(b), because the Freedman test was designed for
administrative prior restraints.
To be clear, Freedman is a case about the procedural
requirements that attach before a prior restraint can be
imposed. Professor Balkin has criticized the Doe court for
applying it, because "[i]nvoking Freedman meant that the
Second Circuit was deliberately lowering the bar for judicial
scrutiny."135 But this objection somewhat misreads Doe. The
Doe court, as noted, applied Freedman merely to the procedural
dimension of the NSL statute, but applied strict scrutiny to the
statute's substance.136 This makes sense; in cases where the
speech subject to suppression is clearly protected by the First
Amendment, the substance and procedure of a statute should
both comport with the Constitution. 137
For SCA orders, however, Freedman should have no
application. As Judge Robart observed, Freedman involved
administrative prior restraints imposed by a licensing scheme,
whereas § 2705(b) orders "are more analogous to permanent
injunctions preventing speech from taking place before it
occurs."138 It made sense to apply Freedman in Doe, because
gag orders in NSLs are in the first instance directly issued by
the FBI; it makes less sense with respect to the SCA, where
prior restraint is sought by the government but issued by a
court.
That conclusion does not end the inquiry, however, because
even when a prior restraint comes in the form of a court order,
the process must meet some procedural minimums. As
Professor Redish as put it, "[a] speaker must be afforded an
opportunity in a full and fair judicial hearing to contest any
restraint before it is imposed."139 In Carroll v. President and
135 See Balkin, supra note 98, at 2335.
136 See text accompanying supra notes 42-46.
137 See Microsoft Corp. v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 233 F. Supp. 3d 887, 906 (W.D.
Wash. 2017) ("In any event, even if the procedural safeguards outlined in
Freedman are met, the Government must show that the statute in question
meets strict scrutiny.").
138 Id.
139 Redish, supra note 23, at 89.
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Commissioners of Princess Anne, for example, the Supreme
Court set aside a state court's restraining order "because of a
basic infirmity in the procedure by which it was obtained."
140
The order "was issued ex parte, without notice to petitioners
and without any effort, however informal, to invite or permit
their participation in the proceedings." 141 The Court held that
the First Amendment prohibits such orders absent a showing
"that it is impossible to serve or to notify the opposing parties
and to give them an opportunity to participate." 142 Accordingly,
a party subject to a § 2705(b) order must at a minimum have
notice of a prior restraint and an opportunity to participate in
the proceeding in order to challenge it.
Judge Robart did not make findings about the statute's
procedural due process components (or lack thereo). But the
problems here are serious. The process devised by § 2705(b)
does not contemplate notice to, or the participation of, the
service provider sought to be gagged; 143 the provider can seek to
move or quash a gag order only after it has already been
issued.144 The proceeding is, as a result, effectively ex parte.
And as Twitter observes, a provider will rarely have the
knowledge necessary to assess whether a challenge to a
particular gag order would be meritorious.145 How can
Microsoft know, for example, whether the government's
investigation has reached the point where the justification for
secrecy no longer applies?146 Under these conditions, it is
difficult to conceive of circumstances in which a service
provider has a meaningful opportunity to participate in the
proceedings.
D. A Judicial Fix
The law's faults are serious. And some of them are quite
clearly commanded by the statutory text. Ideally, Congress
would amend the statute to rectify the constitutional problems,
crafting a regime that neither compromises legitimate law
enforcement interests nor runs afoul of the First Amendment.
140 393 U.S. 175, 180 (1968).
141 Id.
142 Id.
143 See Matter of Application of United States of Am., 45 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6 (D.D.C.
2014) ("In addition, section 2705(b) includes no requirement that the service
provider be afforded an opportunity to intervene to be heard on the merits of
the government's application for a non-disclosure order prior to the court
issuing the nondisclosure order.").
144 Id.
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Legislative gridlock makes that unlikely, but Microsoft could
provide impetus for reform.
The Department of Justice's guidance-which, to be sure, is
a document without the force of law-is a step in the right
direction. It appears that prior to Microsoft, the government
would routinely deploy indefinite gag orders based on little
more than boilerplate justifications.147 This guidance will likely
curb those abuses of the statute. Still, the guidance does not go
far enough, even if a strict scrutiny standard applies. The
requirement that orders have an "appropriate factual basis"
148
is not obviously more stringent than the statute's permissive
"reason to believe" standard. Moreover, one year-the limit for
gag orders, in the first instance-may still be longer than
necessary for many orders, and extensions appear indefinitely
available if "additional, specific facts" have been developed
during the investigation. Orders longer than a year are
permitted in "exceptional circumstances." 149 Ultimately, much
of the language in the guidance is vague, and time will tell how
much the government alters its past practice.
To some degree, then, the statute's constitutional problems
remain. We might consider how a court following in the steps of
the Doe decision would interpret the statute in a manner that
avoids constitutional problems. Doe took that canon of
construction close to its limit-perhaps too close. But it is
nonetheless useful to consider how the statute might be read as
constitutionally compliant.
The three substantive problems identified in Microsoft are
not so challenging to solve. First, the court would have to
narrowly construe the words "for such period as the court
deems appropriate" in the statute.150 A limit of one year, as the
government's guidance requires, is still quite long-a period of
thirty or sixty days may come closer to meeting the narrow
tailoring requirement. 151  Sneak-and-peek warrants, for
147 See Brad Smith, DOJ Acts to Curb the Overuse of Secrecy Orders. Now It's
Congress' Turn., MICROSOFT (Oct. 23, 2017), http://blogs.microsoft.com/on-the-
issues/?p=55096 [http://perma.cc/9AZ2-TLPM] ("Until today, vague legal
standards have allowed the government to get indefinite secrecy orders
routinely, regardless of whether they were even based on the specifics of the
investigation at hand. That will no longer be true.").
148 See Rosenstein Memorandum, supra note 95, at 1.
149 Id.
150 18 U.S.C. § 2705(b) (2012).
151 The SCA's delayed-notice provision, found at § 2705(a), permits the
government to obtain an order delaying notification "for a period not to
exceed ninety days." 18 U.S.C. § 2705(a)(1)(A), (B) (2012). But as Professor
Kerr has observed, that period is already "simply too long" and "serves no
legitimate purpose." Kerr, supra note 59, at 1235. A thirty-day period is
sufficient for police "to assess the evidence, pursue leads, and indict the
target if necessary." Id.
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example, tend to have a more limited duration,152 with
extensions permitted where the government provides a "fresh
showing of the need for further delay."153 Creating a clear and
reasonable temporal limit, and requiring the government to
justify any extensions of that limit, ensures that speech is not
restrained any longer than it needs to be. The government
would surely protest such a requirement as overly burdensome,
but it is not one that the government is unable to bear or that
is disproportionate to the competing interests at stake.
Second, the court should construe "reason to believe" in
§ 2705(b) to mean "good reason to believe." Recall that the
Second Circuit in Doe confronted a similar issue: The statute
commanded that a court must uphold an NSL gag order unless
it found "no reason to believe" that an identified harm would
occur. In Doe, the court construed this to mean "good reason to
believe."154 So too, here: strict scrutiny requires that a service
provider's First Amendment rights not be limited absent
concrete evidence showing it is necessary. Permitting gag
orders to issue on the basis of speculative and generalized
information inevitably results in an overbroad suppression of
speech. But if a court has a good reason to believe some
enumerated harm would follow from disclosure, that suggests
proper grounding for a gag order.
Third, the court should take a narrow reading of the words
"seriously jeopardize" and "unduly delay" in §2705(b)(5). There
is an instructive comparison to Doe here, too: The court there
narrowed the statute by holding that all of the enumerated
harms must relate to the statute's focus on terrorism and
intelligence gathering.155 The SCA merits a similarly strict
construction. The interests here can be compelling, but only if
the statute's language is read sufficiently narrowly. For
example, a court should not consider that disclosure will
"seriously jeopardize" an investigation unless it would actually
imperil the entire investigation. And a court should strictly
interpret "unduly delay," perhaps to mean that the delay would
be substantial (that is, more than what is considered normal)
152 Even under the amended and more controversial version of the sneak-and-
peek statute, notice of a search may be delayed only if "the warrant provides
for the giving of such notice within a reasonable period not to exceed 30 days
after the date of its execution, or on a later date certain if the facts of the case
justify a longer period of delay." 18 U.S.C. § 3103a(b)(3) (2012). The delay can
be extended only if "an updated showing of the need for further delay" is
made and "each additional delay [is] limited to periods of 90 days or less,
unless the facts of the case justify a longer period of delay." Id. § 3103a(c).
These provisions appear to have been added in 2006. See Pub. L. No. 109-177,
title I, § 114, 120 Stat. 177, 210 (2006).
153 United States v. Villegas, 899 F.2d 1324, 1337 (2d Cir. 1990).
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and likely prejudicial. These findings must, again, be case-
specific and evidence-based.
Remedying the procedural problems in the gag-order
framework is more difficult, but not impossibly so. As noted,
the statute does not require "that the service provider be
afforded an opportunity to intervene to be heard on the merits
of the government's application for a non-disclosure order prior
to the court issuing" the order. 156 A court's authority to devise a
"statutory basis" for intervention where there is none might
strike one as dubious.157 But it is certainly not without
precedent. The Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, for
example, make no reference to the right to intervene in a
criminal case. But the Second Circuit has nonetheless held that
such a motion is a proper vehicle for third parties to assert a
First Amendment right of access to court proceedings.158 It
based that holding on federal courts' "authority to 'formulate
procedural rules not specifically required by the Constitution or
the Congress' to 'implement a remedy for violation of
recognized rights."'1 59 Courts have taken a similar tack for
third parties seeking to intervene in a civil case to challenge a
confidentiality order. Although Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
24 is perhaps, on its face, "a questionable procedural basis" for
such an intervention, courts have found that basis on a "broad-
gauged" reading of Rule 24.160
Here, too, a court could devise a method for service
providers to intervene in gag-order proceedings. Like the
"reciprocal notice procedure" in Doe, this process would give the
government a path for obtaining a § 2705(b) order without
running afoul of the First Amendment. Under this procedure,
the government would be required to notify a service provider
of its intention to seek a gag order, and the provider could
participate in the proceeding by way of a simple motion to
intervene. The government would also be required to give the
provider sufficient information at every stage, including when
the government seeks extensions of the original order. And the
government would, of course, always bear the burden of proof.
From a digital privacy perspective, this procedure is imperfect:
156 In re Order of Nondisclosure, 45 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2014).
157 Id.
158 United States v. Aref, 533 F.3d 72, 81 (2d Cir. 2008); see also In re Associated
Press, 162 F.3d 503, 507 (7th Cir. 1998) (allowing a party to intervene in a
criminal case to assert First Amendment right to access to court proceedings).
159 Aref, 533 F.3d at 81 (quoting United States v. Hasting, 461 U.S. 499, 505
(1983)).
160 Jessup v. Luther, 227 F.3d 993, 997 (7th Cir. 2000) ("[Elvery court of appeals
to have considered the matter has come to the conclusion that Rule 24 is
sufficiently broad-gauged to support a request of intervention for the
purposes of challenging confidentiality orders.").
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Ultimately, a service provider has to be sufficiently motivated
and well-resourced to challenge the government's gag order.
But it provides a possible remedy to the First Amendment
problems with the statute's procedural framework.
IV. CONCLUSION
The government's interest in effective surveillance is
important. But so are the First Amendment interests at stake.
The notion that prior restraints are to be regarded as
particularly dangerous dates back to William Blackstone6 1 and
has been part of the First Amendment's firmament since the
early twentieth century.16 2 Courts inclined to carve out an
exception for gag orders in the age of digital surveillance
should be mindful of that history and proceed carefully.
161 SMOLLA & NIMMER, supra note 4, § 15:2.
162 See Nearv. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931).
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